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FAIRNESS IN THE COPYRIGHT
ACT'S FAIR USE DOCTRINE*
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises
The Copyright Act2 grants a bundle of exclusive rights to the copyright-
holder. The most important rights enable the copyrightholder to regulate
reproduction of the copyrighted work3 and to bring an action for infringe-
ment of these exclusive rights4 if the infringement involves a copying of the
original work-. These rights are not absolute and various exceptions and
limitations exist. One statutory exception is the fair use defense6 which ex-
* © Copyright 1987 Thomas P. McBride.
1. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
2. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982). The Copyright Act of 1976 was the cul-
mination of a major revision of the 1909 Act. The first copyright statute was enacted
in 1790. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. Subsequent revisions were made
in 1831; Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436; in 1870, Act of July 8, 1870, ch.
230, 16 Stat. 198; and in 1909, Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 16, 35 Stat. 1075. The 1976
Act was the Act of Oct., 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541.
3. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982) provides:
Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this title
has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies ... ;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies ... of the copyrighted work to the public by sale
or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending ....
Id.
4. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1982) ("Anyone who violates any of the exclusive
rights of the copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 118 ... is an
infringer of the copyright.").
5. For general purposes, copying and reproduction can be considered to be
synonymous. 2 M. NURMER, Nmsi R ON COPYRIGHT §§ 8.01[A]-.02[A] (1985). The
definition of "copies" in section 101 of the Act includes only those copies which are
fixed in a tangible medium. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). It is this type of copy to which
section 106 applies. The test for determining if a work is copied from another as a
basis for an infringement action consists of proof of access and substantial similarity.
Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir.
1977) (outlines the elements necessary to find an infringement). See generally 3 M.
NI11MR, supra, § 13.01[B].
6. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982). The relevant statutory language states:
notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted
work... for purposes such as criticism, comment, newsreporting, teaching,
.. scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In deter-
mining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use
the factors to be considered shall include-
1
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cuses an otherwise infringing work if the purpose of the second work was
either criticism, comment, newsreporting, teaching, scholarship, or research.
Another is the uncopyrightability of facts and ideas7 which requires the au-
thor's work to be original and limits the copyright to the actual expression
used. The primary limitation is the constitutional right of free speech imposed
by the first amendment.'
In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,9 the United
States Supreme Court held that an unauthorized use of quotations from a
public figure's unpublished manuscript was an infringement of the copyright
holder's exclusive rights.' 0 The Court found that the use was not excused
under the fair use exception and that the author's right to control the first
public appearance of his undisseminated expression will outweigh a claim of
fair use." Although the Court reached an equitable result, the fair use analysis
over-emphasized the economic effect of copyright and particularly the first
publication right. This type of analysis disregarded the legislative intent which
balanced all of the factors relevant to fair use in order to reach an equitable
decision.' 2 The Court also refused to apply first amendment values to broaden
the scope of fair use,'3 and effectually placed the economic value of copyright
above first amendment values. The Court re-emphasized the position that first
amendment protections were already embodied in the Copyright Act.'4 This
Note will discuss the Court's method of analysis concerning fair use, the
"right of first publication," the first amendment, the effect on future co-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
Id.
7. Id. § 102(b) (copyright embodies the requirement of originality with the
author and no author can claim ownership of an idea nor of factual matters).
8. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press . . .
9. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
10. Id. at 548-49.
11. Id. at 549-50.
12. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 historical note (1982). Referring to H.R. RP. 1476,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1976), the historical note states:
Indeed, since the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no generally ap-
plicable definition is possible, and each case raising the question must be
decided on its own facts. On the other hand, the courts have evolved a set
of criteria which, though in no case definitive or determinative, provide
some gauge for balancing the equities.
17 U.S.C. § 107 historical note.
13. 471 U.S. at 555-60.
14. Id. at 560.
[Vol. 52
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pyright cases which involve public figures, and, finally, the implications for
the press and publishers will be considered.
On April 3, 1979, The Nation'5 published a front-page article entitled
"The Ford Memoirs-Behind the Nixon Pardon." The article covered the
soon-to-be published memoirs of President Gerald Ford,' 6 and presented a
synopsis of some of the important aspects of the book. 17 The content of the
article was almost exclusively drawn from the unpublished manuscript.' It
included President Ford's impressions, views, and perceptions of various
occurrences and personalities which he confronted during his presidency.' 9
The Nation's article was approximately 2250 words long, 300-400 of which
were direct quotes from Ford's book. 20
Although the appearance of The Nation's article precipitated the lawsuit,
the publishing agreement between Ford and Harper & Row was the backbone
of the dispute. Harper & Row obtained from Ford the right to copyright the
book.2' They also owned the licensing rights for pre-publication excerpts from
the book.2" Time, Incorporated bought the pre-publication rights and paid
$12,500 in advance for them. Time was to pay another $12,500 after pub-
lication of its article.Y The Nation's article appeared about two weeks prior
15. The Nation is perhaps America's oldest continuously published weekly
magazine. The Nation primarily presents political commentary and news. The first
volume of The Nation was published on July 6, 1865. The Ford memoirs article
appeared in the April 7, 1979 edition, Volume 228, No.13, p.353.
16. Victor Navasky, The Nation's editor, obtained a copy of the unpublished
manuscript from an unidentified source. Mr. Navasky read the manuscript, wrote
the article and then returned the manuscript to his source. Ford's book "A Time to
Heal: The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford" has since been published and copy-
righted through the statutory formalities. No argument has been made as to its right
to protection at the time of The Nation's article. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 543
17. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 543.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 545. Specific mention was given to Ford's descriptions of the de-
cision to pardon President Nixon, Ford's conversations with members of the White
House staff, and other events of Ford's presidency. The Appendix to the Court's
opinion reproduces The Nation article in full. Id. at 570-79.
20. Id. at 545. The direct quotes are printed in bold face type in the Court's
Appendix. Id. at 570-79.
21. Copyright initially vests in the original author. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1982).
The author can sell or grant the copyright to another, usually in return for a sum
of money. Id. § 201(d). Ford was the original author, but contractually agreed to
give Harper & Row the exclusive rights under copyright. Harper & Row, 471 U.S.
at 542.
22. 471 U.S. at 542. Prepublication excerpt rights are often granted as a
marketing technique to spark interest in the book. They usually take the form of
excerpts from the most interesting part of the work and are printed in a publication
with a national audience.
23. Id. at 542-43. The Time contract specifically included the right to print
Ford's version of the Nixon pardon. Id.
1987]
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to Time's projected article and Time immediately -cancelled its contract with
Harper & Row. 4
Harper & Row filed an action alleging copyright infringement and other
state law claims shortly after The Nation's article appeared and after Time's
cancellation. 2 The district court found an infringement which was not ex-
cused by fair use,2 and the court's discussion was brief and conclusory.27
The court used a "totality of the work" approach to the copyrightability
problem. 28 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed in a 2-1
decision. 29 The court of appeals squarely addressed the copyrightability prob-
lem and "stripped away" all of the facts and. information appearing in the
article which were not copyrightable.30 They also disregarded any paraphras-
ing of disparate facts before proceeding with an analysis under fair use.3
The majority noted the first amendment implications present and considered
them throughout their analysis.32
The majority of the United States Supreme Court decided it was not
necessary to resolve the copyrightability question -ppsed by the court of ap-
peals. 3 Finding that the verbatim quotes from the mariuscript (which totalled
300-400 words) were copyrightable expressions, the Court would only excuse
their use if it were a fair use.34
The Court focused first upon the fact that Ford's manuscript was un-
published.3" Claiming that the right of first publication is different from the
other rights under section 106 of the Act,36 the Court discussed the importance
of preserving this right to the original copyright holder. This right, the ma-
jority argued, allows the copyright holder to capture the full commercial
value of exclusivity. 7 The copyright holder can also decide when, where, and
in what form to first distribute his work.3" As axesult of the stated importance
24. Id. at 543.
25. Harper & Row, Publ. v. Nation Enters., 557 F. Supp. 1067 (S.D.N.Y.),
rev'd, 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
26. Id. at 1073.
27. Id. at 1072.
28. Id.
29. Harper & Row, Publ. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983),
rev'd, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
30. Id. at 206.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 203-04,
33. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 548-49; see infra notes 109-10 and accompany-
ing text.
34. 471 U.S. at 548-49, 560. The Nation conceded that the 300-400 words
were verbatim quotes and would be copyrightable expression. Id. at 565 n.-8.
35. Id. at 549.
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of exclusivity, the majority argued that the balance of equities shifts against
the claimant in a claim of fair use of an unpublished work.3 9
Section 106 of the Copyright Act lists the exclusive rights granted to the
author and states that they are "subject to section 107." 4 Section 107, the
fair use provision, clearly states "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of section
106" before setting out the relevant factors to consider for analysis. 41 The
majority contended that despite the language of the statute, the importance
of the right of first publication required the fair use analysis to be viewed
narrowly.42 As a final assertion, the Court proclaimed: "Under ordinary
circumstances, the author's right to control the first public appearance of
his undisseminated expression will outweigh a claim of fair use." '43
Although the majority properly examined the right of first publication
as a part of their total analysis, they imparted too much weight to this
factor. 44 The right of first publication should be weighed just like the other
statutory factors or other relevant factors. It is this author's position that
an over-emphasis of this factor results in a misapplication of the fair use
doctrine in that it does not equitably balance the concerns of each factor
individually.
To combat the pre-publication argument, The Nation argued that the
first amendment values present in the case required a different analysis. 4
The Nation asserted that the "substantial public import of the subject matter
39. Id.
40. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
41. Id. § 107.
42. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 549-55. The majority found support for this
view from the legislative committee reports during the revision of the 1909 Copyright
Act. A Senate Report stated "[t]he applicability of the fair use doctrine to unpublished
works is narrowly limited since, although the work is unavailable, this is the result
of a deliberate choice on the part of the copyright owner." Id. at 553 (quoting S.
REP. No. 473, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. 64 (1975)). This passage dealt with fair use as it
applied to photocopied materials and was not found in the House Reports. Id. at
554 (discussing H.R. RiP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, 66 (1976)). The majority
cited this passage, discussed the history, and found that the House had incorporated
it by reference. Id. Further support was found in cases involving common law copy-
right. See American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 299 (1907) (dealing
with a work of art which had not been shown to the general public, the Court stated
"[t]he property of the author or painter in his intellectual creation is absolute until
he voluntarily parts with the same."). See generally, 2 M. NIMER, supra note 5, §
8.23 (citing cases and text in support of the majority view of common law copyright's
absolute protection to unpublished works).
43. 471 U.S. at 555.
44. The majority opinion does say: "We conclude that the unpublished nature
of a work is '[a] key, though not necessarily determinative, factor' tending to negate
a defense of fair use." Id. at 554 (quoting S. REP. No. 473, supra note 42, at 64).
However, the tenor of the opinion gave great weight to this factor, rather than an
equal share of a balanced analysis.
45. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 555.
19871
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of the Ford memoirs," the newsworthiness of the publication of the book
itself, and the "public's interest in learning this news as fast as possible
outweigh[ed] the right of the author to control its first publication." 46 The
Nation further stated that the copying of Ford's expression was essential to
the news story and "the precise manner in which [he] expressed himself was
as newsworthy as what he had to say." 47 The presence of such important
first amendment values, as argued by The Nation, persuaded the Court to
reconsider its reliance on the strength of the first publication right.
The Court responded to this argument about first amendment values, 48
and its analysis required an understanding of the potential conflict between
the first amendment and the copyright law's grant of exclusive rights. The
United States Constitution authorizes Congress to enact a copyright statute, 49
while the first amendment states that "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging freedom of speech or the press." 50 The constitutional authority for
both of these rights was granted contemporaneously by the framers of the
Constitution." It is generally agreed that both rights were intended to coexist
and to balance each other. 2 The law that a subsequent author cannot use
previously copyrighted words without the copyright holder's permission seems
to cause the Copyright Act to collide with the first amendment. This is
because the subsequent user's right of free speech is encroached.13 However,
the predominant view is that the Copyright Act incorporated the first amend-
ment rights through limitations within the Act.5 4 One such limitation found
in the Copyright Act which protects first amendment rights is labeled the
idea-expression dichotomy.5 5 Copyright protects an author's expression, but
not the ideas behind that expression.5 6 This limitation allows for a full dis-
46. Id. at 556.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 555-60.
49. U.S. CoNrsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The enabling language reads: "The Congress
shall have Power... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries . . ." Id.
50. U.S. CONST. amend I.
51. The U.S. Constitution was completed in 1788 and ratified by all 13 states
by 1790. The first 10 amendments were completed in 1789 and ratified by 1791.
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the Framer's drafted and viewed them
in light of one another. See also I M. NBMER, supra note 5, § 1.10[A] n.7.
52. See Sobel, Copyright and the First Amendment: A Gathering Storm?, 19
COPYi GHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 43 (1971).
53. See generally Sobel, supra note 52; Goldstein, Copyright and The First
Amendment, 70 CoLuM. L. Rlv. 983 (1970); Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge The
First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REv. 1180
(1970).
54. See generally 1 M. NIMER, supra note 5, § 1.10[B][2].
55. See id.
56. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217-18, reh'g denied, 347 U.S.
[Vol. 52
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cussion of the ideas on any subject since no one can claim an exclusive right
to the idea. However, copyright does not allow appropriation of the exact
or similar expression used to capture the idea by a previous author. There-
fore, the copyrightability only of one's expression, and not the ideas em-
bodied therein, "strike a definitional balance between the First Amendment
and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while still
protecting an author's expression. ' 57 In certain situations, the first amend-
ment may expressly limit copyright, 8 and the privilege of the first amendment
may be invoked in preference to a fair use analysis.5 9 Generally, courts are
reluctant to sustain a first amendment defense in copyright cases.60
Another limitation embodied in copyright excludes protection to the
presentation of facts or information.6 1 Copyright protects original works of
authorship. Since no one can claim originality to facts, copyright protection
of them cannot be invoked. This limitation also preserves first amendment
policies since the use of facts and information cannot be monopolized. There-
949 (1954); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1977).
57. Harper & Row, Publ. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 1983),
rev'd, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
58. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 5, § 1.10[C](2). Professor Nimmer suggests that
certain situations exist where the idea and the expression are uniquely tied together.
The pictures of the My Lai Massacre from the Vietnam War support this theory.
Also suggested in support are the Zapruder films of the assassination of President
Kennedy. See Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (case involving a copying of the Zapruder films where the court did not expressly
apply the first amendment, but did consider "the public interest in having the fullest
information available on the murder of President Kennedy"); Rosemont Enters. v.
Random House, 366 F.2d 303, 309 (2d Cir. 1966) (in a case involving an unauthorized
biography of Howard Hughes, the court stated that the fair use provision was ap-
plicable but used language reflective of first amendment values), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 1009 (1967); see also Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st
Cir. 1967) (copyright protection does not extend to rules for a game because 'the
topic necessarily requires,' if not only one form of expression, at best only a limited
number .... ." Id. at 678 (citations omitted)).
59. 1 M. NaMER, supra note 5, § 1.10[D]. The scope and extent of fair use
falls within the discretion of Congress. The limitations of the first amendment are
imposed upon Congress itself.
60. Wait Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 345 F. Supp. 108, 115 (N.D. Cal.
1972) (court refused to extend first amendment protection to this case and stated that
to do so "would serve to obliterate copyright protection in any instance in which the
alleged infringer could claim the intent to convey an idea"), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979); see also
Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1171
(9th Cir. 1977) ("[T]he defendants in this case had many ways to express the idea
of a fantasyland with characters, but chose to copy the expression of plaintiffs'. The
first amendment will not protect such imitation.").
61. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). See generally 1 M. NIMMR, supra note 5, §
2.11[A] (general rule of nonprotection of factual works).
1987]
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fore, subsequent authors have free access to them for their particular use.
This limitation extends to historical works,62 some biographical works, 63 and
to the news element.M
The Nation contended that the important first amendment values pre-
sented in the case should broaden the scope of fair use. 65 The majority in
Harper & Row rejected this argument and re-affirmed the traditional view
that first amendment values are protected within the Act itself.6 The majority
contended that to accept The Nation's arguments concerning the public im-
port in knowing what the President said concerning one of the most impor-
tant events in recent history would destroy the President's right to receive
the financial return on his book.67 The analysis continued, asserting that the
right of first publication and the economic value of that right outweighed
any possible claim of free speech. 68 Indeed, the majority stated that "the
promise of copyright would be an empty one if it could be avoided merely
by dubbing the infringement a fair use 'news report' of the book."'69
The Court disregarded The Nation's first amendment arguments, not
using them as a factor in the fair use analysis. They essentially claimed that,
even if The Nation's article were a "news story," that would not overcome
the fact that it was published before the initial release of the book.7 0 The
62. See Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 618 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1980)
(Concerning two books about the Hindenberg dirigible disaster, the court stated:
"[T]he protection afforded the copyright holder has never extended to history, be it
documented fact or explanatory hypothesis .... [T]he cause of knowledge is best
served when history is the common property of all, and each generation remains free
to draw upon the discoveries and insights of the past.").
63. See, e.g., Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d
Cir. 1966) (Concerning a biography of Howard Hughes, the court stated: "[W]hile
the mode of expression employed... is entitled to copyright protection, [the author]
could not acquire by copyright a monopoly in the narration of historical events.").
64. See International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234 (1918)
("[T]he news element - the information respecting current events contained in the
literary production - is not the creation of the writer, but is a report of matters that
ordinarily are publicijuris; it is the history of the day.").
65. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 555-60.
66. Id. at 560.
67. Id. at 556.
68. Id. at 557.
69. Id. (citing Wainwright Sec. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91,
96 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978)). In Wainwright, the defendant
abstracted plaintiff's original work concerning financial reports of major corporations
and printed them as a "news article" in his (defendant's) weekly newspaper which
was concerned with financial news. Wainwright, 558 F.2d at 93-94. The court held
that the abstract was not a news event in that it appropriated almost verbatim the
most creative and original aspects of the Wainwright reports. Id. at 96. Also signif-
icant was the fact that defendants attempted to "take away" the market for the
original reports. This is also a fairly "commercial" as opposed to "non-profit edu-
cational" purpose.
70. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556.
[Vol. 52
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majority refused to separate the right of first publication and the first amend-
ment values present in the case. If the Court had done so, it could have
balanced these factors along with the other statutory factors.7' Instead, the
Court rejected the first amendment claims by analyzing their effect on the
right of first publication. This enabled the Court to further emphasize its
apparent belief that the first publication right is more than just a factor to
be considered. The majority's approach to the right of first publication factor
suggested that it may be of paramounit importance in future copyright cases
involving first amendment claims.
Turning next to a discussion of the doctrine of fair use, the majority
maintained its economic approach to copyright which centered on the right
of first publication. The doctrine of fair use originated as an equitable
doctrine72 which excused the use of a work which would otherwise be deemed
infringing.73 The analysis centers on the four statutory factors, but those are
not exclusive. 74
The first statutory factor to consider is the "Purpose and Character of
the Use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes." 75 The majority's discussion opened by
agreeing with the court of appeals that The Nation's use was "newsreport-
ing." ' 76 They agreed that if the article were news, it is then a productive use
and a factor to consider in the analysis. 77 The Court limited the effect of
71. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982). The statute reads "the factors to be considered
shall include," which suggests that the analysis is not limited to the four enumerated
factors, but other factors relevant to a particular fact situation should also be con-
sidered.
72. The first judicial recognition of fair use was in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F.
Cas. 342 (C.C. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901) (quoted in Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 550).
The Folsom Court stated:
[A] reviewer may fairly cite largely from the original work, if his design be
really and truly to use the passages for the purposes of fair and reasonable
criticism. On the other hand, it is as clear, that if he thus cites the most
important parts of the work, with a view, not to criticise, but to supersede
the use of the original work, and substitute the review for it, such a use
will be deemed in law a piracy.
Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 344-45. The fair use doctrine was codified for the first time in
the 1976 Copyright Revision Act. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982). This codification was
"intended to restate the [pre-existing] judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change,
narrow, or enlarge it in any way" H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66
(1976).
73. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1983).
74. See id. § 101 (defines "including" to be illustrative and not exclusive);
see also supra note 71.
75. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1983) (Fair use purposes listed in the statute's preamble
include "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching .... scholarship or re-
search.").
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this factor by stating: "[T]he Nation went beyond simply reporting unco-
pyrightable information and actively sought to exploit the headline value of
its infringement, making a 'news event' out of its unauthorized first publi-
cation of a noted figure's copyrighted expression." '78 The effect of the ma-
jority's statement was to join the "purpose of the use" factor with the "right
of first publication" factor. This coupling enabled the majority to lessen the
impact of The Nation's clear newsreporting purpose and to again include an
economic analysis of the right of first publication.
Also under the "purpose and character of the use" factor, the com-
mercial or nonprofit nature of the work must be considered. 79 The majority
quoted language from Sony Corporation v. Universal City Studios,80 which
stated that every commercial use of a copyrighted work is presumptively
unfair.8 The majority stated that a use for profit cuts against a finding of
fair use.8" As pointed out by the dissenting opinion, 3 the majority's reasoning
is analytically weak on this point.84 In an attempt to protect the economic
value of copyright, the majority read the statute inconsistently with the ob-
vious intent of Congress. Congress was surely aware that most newsreporting
is done for profit. It is inconsistent to include newsreporting as an example
of a fair use, knowing it is done for profit, yet have a court presume its
unfairness if in fact done for profit.8
The second factor of fair use is the "Nature of the copyrighted work." '86
The majority characterized Ford's memoirs as an unpublished historical nar-
rative.87 After acknowledging that a greater public interest lies in dissemi-
nating factual works rather than works of fiction, the Court concluded that
The Nation's article did more than convey facts. 8 The Nation's extensive
use of the "most expressive elements of the work"89 was deemed to exceed
the public interest in knowing facts. The unpublished nature of the work
78. Id.
79. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1983).
80. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
81. Id. at 451.
82. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562.
83. Id. at 580.
84. This may be due to the distinguishing facts of Sony when compared to
Harper & Row. In Sony, the use in question was recording copyrighted television
programs, using videotape recorders manufactured by Sony, for personal use. Sony,
464 U.S. at 420. Congress had expressed no judgment on the use. Id. at 431. The
use in Sony also appropriated the entire work. Since Congress expressly stated news-
reporting as an example of fair use, the language in Sony on this issue is not per-
suasive. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 592 n.16.
85. 471 U.S. at 592 n.16.
86. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (1983).
87. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 563.
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was again focused on.9 This reasoning, as the dissent notes, 91 basically pro-
tects the full economic impact of the author's work. Even when the nature
of the author's work is primarily factual, the majority reasoned that use
made of an unpublished work will still be a factor weighing against fair use.
The Court's analysis confused what should be considered under the
"nature of the copyrighted work" factor. The analysis should include whether
the work is fact or fiction and whether or not the work has already been
published. The unpublished nature of a work should not be a categorical
presumption against fair use as the majority implies. Rather, it should be
weighed as a factor to consider under the "nature of the copyrighted work"
heading. The effect of whether the work has already been published is a
consideration more relevant to the "effect on the market" factor. 92
The third factor to be considered under the fair use test concerns the
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole. 9 This analysis includes a quantitative94 and qualitative95
examination of the alleged infringing work in comparison to the original
work. The majority noted that the quotes used by The Nation were "insub-
stantial" in relation to Ford's final product. 96 However, qualitatively the
article excerpted the most powerful and important chapters and used them
as the primary focus of the infringing work.97 This substantial appropriation
weighed against finding fair use. The dissent argued that the majority con-
fused its analysis by not distinguishing between expression and information
and ideas. 9 Even though The Nation's article used the most powerful parts
of the original work, it is not persuasive in a substantiality argument if those
parts were uncopyrightable subject matter. The dissent also argued that the
majority based its analysis upon the use's inappropriateness in relation to its
prepublication timing. 99 Although the majority opinion did not actually state
this, it can be implied from its analysis. It declared that: "substantial quo-
90. Id.
91. Id. at 595.
92. See infra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
93. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1983).
94. Consumers Union of United States v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d
1044, 1050 (2d Cir. 1983) (verbatim copying of 29 out of 2100 words held to be a
fair use), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984); Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (approximately 1% usage was held
to be quantitatively substantial), aff'd 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
826 (1982). See generally 3 M. NnuSmR, supra note 5, § 13.05[A][3].
95. Roy Export Co., 503 F. Supp. at 1145 (use of the best scenes from Charlie
Chaplin's movies was held to be qualitatively substantially great even though the
quantitative use was only 1% of the movie).
96. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 565.
97. Id. at 566.
98. Id. at 600.
99. Id. at 601.
1987]
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tations might qualify as a fair use in ... a news account of a speech that
has [already] been delivered to the public.'10 If the majority believed that
substantial quotation would be appropriate post-publication, its primary ob-
jection in this case must have been that the substantial quotation was done
prior to publication. As a result, the majority incorporated an economic
analysis into the "amount and substantiality of the portion used" factor.
The majority went beyond looking at the amount and substantiality of the
use and added the effect of the use on the market. That analysis should be
limited to the factor Congress specifically intended for such analysis: the
effect on the market.
The final and most important enumerated factor in the fair use analysis
is the effect on the market.' 0' Copyright is "intended to motivate the creative
activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and
to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the limited
period of exclusive control has expired."'' 2 If an unauthorized use eroded
the market value of the original, the purpose of the copyright laws would
be frustrated. To effectuate the purpose of copyright, in terms of fair use,
the effect on the market must be closely scrutinized.
The majority in Harper & Row easily resolved the effect on the market
factor. The Court saw Time's cancellation of its contract with Harper &
Row to be a clear showing of the effect on the market.'0 3 The majority also
recognized that the effect need only be upon the potential market, not the
actual market, for either the copyrighted or derivative work.1 4 The majority
properly placed great weight on the marketability of pre-publication serial-
ization rights in its analysis.
The dissent believed that the majority again confused the use of infor-
mation versus that of expression. The dissent found the question to be whether
the 300 words quoted verbatim in The Nation's article caused any harm to
the copyrighted work and not whether the entire article caused any economic
harm."05 Agreeing with the court of appeals' finding, the dissent could not
find evidence to support a finding that the use of the copyrighted words
caused Time to cancel its contract.10
Under the "effect on the market" factor, the majority's reasoning is
both sound and persuasive. The holders of a copyright only need to show a
100. Id. at 564. This is analagous to a book released to the public.
101. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1983); see also 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 5, § 1.10[D].
102. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1983).
103. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 567.
104. Id. at 568.
105. Id. at 602. The entire article included facts and information. These aspects
should not have been considered in the analysis because facts and information are
not copyrightable. Including them in the effect on the market analysis gives protection
to unprotectable matter.
106. Id. at 602-03.
[Vol. 52
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potential for economic loss. Time's cancellation of its contract with Harper
& Row represented such a loss. If the infringing article combined both facts
and information with the original author's expression, the copyright holder
should not be required to affirmatively prove that only the copying of the
original author's expression caused the harm. This would be too great a
burden on the copyright holder and difficult to prove. As long as a portion
of the infringing work was based on verbatim quotes, it is obvious that some
of the harm is attributable to them. The court should not put the copyright
holder in the position of deciding whether only the verbatim quotes would
cause harm; rather, the alleged infringer should be forced to prove that he
did not cause any harm.
If fair use is invoked as a defense, any analysis of potential economic
harm to the original work by the alleged infringing work should be limited
to the effect on the market factor. To do otherwise would be contrary to
congressional intent. The statute set up four enumerated factors to consider
in addition to any other relevant factors presented. 107 Each factor should be
considered within its own scope and definition, avoiding dilution by incor-
porating analyses which are more relevant to other factors. Fair use is an
equitable defense and Congress intended for all factors to be considered in
full. Although the effect on the market may be the most important, the
majority erred by including this effect in all the other factors.
The significance of Harper & Row is that it placed the economic value
of copyright, especially the right of first publication, above any first amend-
ment values.*s The Court did not expressly foreclose future use of the first
amendment as a defense in copyright, but certainly showed the lengths it
will go in order to avoid such a defense.
Also of significance is what the majority failed to do. In refusing to
discuss the copyrightability of a factual narrative, the majority missed an
opportunity to settle a judicial difference of opinion on how to analyze that
issue.1 9 The dissent found it necessary, as an initial matter, to resolve this
issue and set out a helpful framework of analysis.110
107. The right of first publication and first amendment values are examples
of other relevant factors.
108. This is reflective of a constitutional principle applied in the federal courts
that requires exhausting all alternative methods of resolving a dispute before turning
to a constitutional answer. See generally J. Now.Ax, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG,
CoNsTrruTIONAL LAw § 2.14(d), at 100-01 (1983).
109. The dispute regards the scope of copyright protection to be afforded an
author who combines facts and information with expression. One view is represented
in Wainwright Sec. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978). In Wainwright, the protection included the author's
analysis, structure, choice of words, and marshalling of facts with emphasis on par-
ticular aspects of the event.
The other view, stated in Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 618 F.2d 972 (2d
19871
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Harper & Row will also have an enormous impact on the press and the
publishing industry. In the future, it will be difficult to claim newsreporting
as the purpose of an article which "scoops" a soon-to-be published book
by a public figure. This "standard journalistic practice" of "scooping" the
news in an upcoming book"' will be carefully scrutinized by editors before
approving publication. To avoid Harper & Row implications, the unpublished
book presumably must include a substantial first amendment concern vital
to the public interest. Harper & Row's holding also applies to speeches and
press releases." 2 Although the harm resulting from work of this type is
difficult to conceive, the principle of Harper & Row is applicable. A question
may arise when an article claimed to be newsreporting is published contem-
poraneously with the first publication of the work and thereby competes with
the profit potential of the book's first publication. Although competing with
the market of the original, this type of use should be deemed a fair use if
there is a bona fide purpose for the newsreporting. As long as the newsreport
is not a verbatim reproduction or close paraphrase of the original, it is
difficult to imagine any court saying the revelations of a public figure in a
book are not newsworthy. If they did, they would be crossing over the
permissible line of freedom of speech and would, in effect, be judicially
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980), would limit protection only to the actual
expression used and to situations where the second work was virtually identical in
usage of words and structure of text. The majority characterized these two cases as
the leading examples of the two sides of the dispute. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at
468. These cases may be distinguishable on their facts since in Wainwright there was
clear paraphrasing of expression from the prior work, whereas in Hoehling there was
use only of the same hypothesis and marshalling of similar facts with the prior work.
See generally I M. NMMOR, supra note 5, § 2.11[D] (Nimmer notes the conflicting
lines of cases and suggests that the Harper & Row dissenting opinion proposes a test
which may resolve the conflict when it inquires into "how closely has the second
author tracked the first author's particular language and structure of presentation;
and how much of the first author's language and structure has the second author
appropriated." Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 583 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis
in original)).
110. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 579-84 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent
adopted the view that infringement must be based on too close and substantial a
tracking of expression of the information presented. They also required analysis of
the language used and the structure of presentation of the alleged infringing work in
comparison to the original work. Id.
Ill. Id. at 591 n.14 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing 5 different occasions from
1976 through 1984 where the New York Times "scooped" a forthcoming manuscript
of a public figure, including Cardinal Spellman, John Ehrlichman, President Nixon,
and John Dean).
112. See King v. Mister Maestro, Inc.. 224 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
Press release of text of soon-to-be-given speech, given only to the press, was held a
limited publication so as not to lose access to copyright protection. Id. at 107. This
particular case involved common law copyright and the 1909 Copyright Act. The
press release in King was authorized; presumably an unauthorized press release would
be analogous to Harper & Row.
[Vol. 52
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determining what is news.11 3 The holding in Harper & Row makes the first
serialization rights even more valuable.14 It enables publishers to relax any
safety measures they use which prevents the unauthorized release of an un-
published manuscript. It could also enable the publisher to give the author
more time in which to write the book since the publisher is insulated from
any loss caused by an unauthorized pre-publication use. Harper & Row may
not inhibit pre-publication scholarly reviews or criticisms. But, if this dis-
tinction is made, the fine line between reviews and newsreporting (when both
are listed in the statute) would be difficult to discern.
It is rare that any work makes news except that by a public figure.
Often, the public figure may want to tell his side of the story of important
events during his life. Those types of works are invariably going to include
facts and information as well as original expression. Public figures deserve
copyright protection like anyone else, but in the broadest sense every event
of their life and much of what they say is newsworthy. The warning by the
dissent that the first author of a historical book will be able to monopolize
the depiction of an event, through copyright,1 5 is not likely to occur. This
is because no author is precluded from writing about an historical event or
a public figure's life, but neither can they appropriate what the public figure/
author or historical writer says before he has the right to secure all the
benefits of first publication.
The proper analysis of a case involving the fair use doctrine should
include a complete discussion of any factor relevant to fair use. The discus-
sion of each separate factor should be limited to those issues within the
definition and scope of that factor. The analysis should be straightforward
and balanced so as to reach an equitable result. If the Court in Harper &
113. See Harper & Row, Publ. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 207, 215 (1983),
rev'd, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
114. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 504-505 (1983). These two sections discuss the remedies
available for an infringement. The copyright owner may recover from the infringer
for the copyright owner's actual damages plus the profits of the infringer or, at the
copyright owner's option, he may recover statutory damages which can run from
$250 to $10,000 as the court deems justified. Id. § 504(b), (c). In the case of a wilful
infringer, statutory damages can go up to $50,000. Id. § 504(c)(2). Attorney's fees
and costs are also recoverable by the copyright owner. Id. § 505. These remedies
along with the finding of an infringement in Harper & Row make it less economically
reasonable to "scoop" a news story, thus raising the value of the first serialization
rights.
115. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 584 n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Hoehling
v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.) (a book concerning the Hin-
denburg disaster with hypothesis and use of facts similar to those of a prior book
held not to be an infringement because no copyright available to historical facts),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980); see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1983) (although
historical facts are not specifically mentioned in section 102(b), they are thought to
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Row would have used this method, the outcome may have been the same,
but the analysis would have been different.
The right of first publication issue would have been a factor weighing
against a claim of fair use since The Nation's article did usurp that exclusive
right. The first amendment values would have supported a claim of fair use.
Freedom of speech comes into play in reporting about the newsworthy his-
torical revelations of a public figure. The right to report such news should
not be limited by the courts. As to the statutory factors, the "purpose and
character of the use" and the "nature of the copyrighted work" both lean
toward a finding of fair use in this case. The purpose was newsreporting and
the nature of the work was a factual narrative, both of which deserve broad
protection under fair use. Factors against the claim of fair use include the
"amount and substantiality of the portion used" and the "effect upon the
market." The Nation's article took the most important qualitative aspects
of the book and directly affected the market concerning the first serialization
rights. At this point, the court must call upon its equitable powers and weigh
each factor in order to decide the case. Even under this type of straightfor-
ward approach, the Court's result is justifiable. What is not justifiable is the
Court's incorporation of unnecessary elements into the analysis of each factor
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